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An ESOP Fable
Managers, Inc.'s workers own the majority of the company's shares. They do not vote for the board of directors;
" Associate Professor, University of Minnesota School of Law. Thank you
to David McGowan, Paul Rubin, and Eugene Volokh for helpful comments.
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instead, a trust votes the workers' shares. Managers, Inc.'s
own directors appoint the committee that votes the trust's
shares. Shockingly, those directors find themselves entrenched, winning repeated reelection under this system.
The workers own the firm, but they have little or no say in
the management of the firm.
Some of those who interact with Managers, Inc. restrain
the company to a degree. Fat Cat the Banker is reluctant
to lend to the firm if it seems too poorly managed, though
Fat Cat has a hard time determining how good the managers of Managers, Inc. are. Widgets, Inc. sells competing
products-if Managers, Inc. does too sloppy a job, it will go
out of business. The Boss at Supercorp may be reluctant to
hire managers from Managers, Inc., if he thinks they are
not doing a good job, though like Fat Cat he has a hard time
distinguishing good managers from bad ones. Senator
Short, not quite getting it, wrote a law encouraging Managers, Inc. and Demoplace Corp., another employee owned
corporation, indiscriminately. All these people do at best a
mediocre job of keeping Managers, Inc. in check. Can the
Judge--one of the most respected members of the community-come to the rescue?
On the other side of town, Demoplace Corp.'s workers
own the majority of the company's shares. They vote for the
board of directors, and help make practical, day-to-day decisions in their immediate workplace. Trust grows between
managers and workers, and the directors and officers are
re-elected, reflecting a job well done. Demoplace Corp.
grows more efficient; its employees are more satisfied; the
workers own and help manage the firm; and the world has
become a slightly more democratic place.
Federal tax law encourages the development of Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs). Many have the inbred control structures of Managers, Inc., but some of them
strive towards the participatory environment of Demoplace
Corp. Can we constrain the former, while still encouraging
the latter? That is the question this article poses. Section
II sets out the factual background for this question. Several reported cases in federal court illustrate the problem
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and some interesting legal issues. In those cases, plaintiffs
have gone to federal court to try to stop managers who use
ESOPs to entrench themselves, claiming the entrenchment
violates fiduciary duties under the Employee Retirement
and Income Security Act (ERISA). In two older district
court cases1 the plaintiffs had succeeded, but in a more recent Sixth Circuit case the plaintiff failed.2
In part, we face a pure doctrinal question-does fiduciary duty under ERISA forbid managerial efforts at entrenchment by those who run ESOPs? Section III addresses that question. I suggest one intermediate doctrinal
position that is quite plausible, albeit not dictated by the
statutory language. On that position, merely voting to reelect oneself as director in an uncontested election should
not suffice to state a claim under ERISA fiduciary law.
However, courts should apply an intermediate level of scrutiny to managerial decisions when managers who control
ESOPs, such as those at Managers, Inc., vote for themselves in a contest for control of the company.
Can the Judge usefully help control Managers, Inc.?
The problem of monitoring willful managers is not a new
one, in the business world or in scholarship about the business world. At least since Berle and Means's classic book
on modem corporations,3 economists have worried about
the split between ownership and control dividing shareholders from managers. Shareholders are the legal owners
of corporations; they receive the residual income that is left
after contractually-required payments are made and the
corporation is supposed to be run in their interest. And yet
managers who often own only a small fraction of a corporation actually run it. Shareholders vote for the board which
appoints top managers, but most shareholders have too
small a stake in any one corporation to pay much attention.
When shareholders do little to monitor managers, managI See ONeill v. Davis, 721 F. Supp. 1013 (N.D. IlM. 1989); Newton
v. Van Otterloo, 756 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Ind. 1991).
2 See Grindstaffv. Green, 133 F.3d 416 (6th Cir. 1998).
3
See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1954).
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ers can find many ingenious ways to make their lives more
pleasant which do not vigorously advance the interests of
the company's owners.
Some have suggested that a worker stake in businesses
could reduce this problem, as worker-owners would have
better information than ordinary shareholders about how
their firm is run and more incentive to intervene if managerial problems arise.4 ESOPs have for several decades been
the most prominent way of promoting worker ownership
within the United States5 And yet, due in part to the way
ESOP law is structured, ESOPs often worsen the ownership/control problem, leaving managers even more firmly
entrenched than in ordinary corporations.6 Most ESOPs
look more like Managers, Inc. than like Demoplace Corp.
Can our Judge, brandishing ERISA fiduciary law to
subdue the arrogant Managers, Inc., help control this
managerial monitoring problem and make the world a better place? This question divides into two parts. First, what
social goal do we hope the Judge's intervention will advance? That is the topic of Section IV. Standard corporate
law scholarly analysis focuses on efficiency;7 however, some
of the most important arguments favoring worker ownership and control of firms concentrate on values such as justice, democracy, and self-realization.8 William Simon has
See, e.g., SAMUEL BOWLES AND HERBERT GiNrIs, The Democratic
Firm: An Agency-theoretic Evaluation, in MARKETS AND DEMOCRACY:
4

PARTICIPATION,

ACCOUNTABILITY AND

EFFICIENCY

13,

27-31

(Samuel

Bowles et al. eds., 1993); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Credit Markets and the
Control of Capital,J. MONEY, CREDIT, & BANKING 1330 (1985).
5
See, e.g., JOSEPH R. BLASI & DOUGLAS L. KRUSE, THE NEW
OWNERS: THE MASS EMERGENCE OF EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP IN PUBLIC
COMPANIES AND WHAT IT MEANS TO AMERICAN BusINESS 23 (1991).
6 See JOSEPH R. BLASI, EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP: REVOLUTION OR
RIPOFF? 12-57 (1988).
7 See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991).
8 See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY
(1985); CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS (1977); JON
ELSTER, Self-Realization in Work and Politics: The Marxist Conception of
the Good Life, in ALTERNATIVES TO CAPITALISM 127-58 (Jon Elster & Karl
Ove Moene eds., 1989).
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argued that corporate law should focus more on issues of
power and politics, not just economics and contracts.9 Still,
even when pursuing goals other than efficiency, careful institutional analysis of suggested policies is vital to effectively pursue whichever goals matter to us. Even many
who enthusiastically support worker ownership because of
their concerns about justice and democracy have been skeptical about the value of ESOPs as a means of advancing
those goals.' ° Indeed many ESOPs may do more to advance
managerial control rather than worker control, so even if
one advocates a goal of economic democracy, as I do in section IV, support for ESOPs does not automatically follow.
Nor is it obvious what advocates of economic democracy
should want courts to do when faced with plaintiffs like
those in the cases before us.
That leads to the second part of the question as to
whether an activist Judge can help us out: given the social
goals we identify as important, what means are best able to
advance those goals? Section V pursues that question. In
that pursuit I advance a comparative institutional
analysis." It is not good enough to say courts are generally
poor at monitoring managers-perhaps in the case of Managers, Inc. all the alternatives are worse.12 Should courts
actively discipline corporate management, or should they
leave that to market forces, to congressional reform of the
law, or to agency regulation? Managers, Inc. may not be
well run, but will the Judge make it more efficient? Mangers, Inc. appears quite undemocratic, especially when
compared to Demoplace Corp., but is the Judge's courthouse
' See William H. Simon, Contract Versus Politics in Corporation
Doctrine, in THE PoLrrics OF LAW 511-38 (David Kairys ed., 3 ed. 1998).
'o See, e.g., David Ellerman, Workers' Cooperatives: The Question of
Legal Structure, in WORKER COOPERATIVES IN AMERICA 257, 262-67
(Robert Jackall & Henry M. Levin eds., 1984).
1 See NEIL KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES (1994) (discussing
comparative institutional analysis).
12 Komesar emphasizes that different institutions may all be poor
at advancing social goals in some circumstances. See infra note 186 and
accompanying text.
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such a good place to advance democracy? It turns out that
none of the four institutions considered here (courts, markets, Congress, and agencies) are particularly well-suited to
monitor ESOP managers, but which one is the least bador rather, what combination of the four institutions is the
least bad?
I shall argue that the alternative I suggest in answer to
the doctrinal question is also an answer to the policy question. Managers who vote for themselves in an uncontested
election should receive the same judicial deference most
managers receive. Where entrenched ESOP managers vote
for themselves in a contested election, however, they should
be forced to defend their decision-making more carefully.
This is not exacting judicial scrutiny; it may not go as far as
some court decisions, but I think that going any further
would do more harm than good. I thus suggest only a small
role for judicial scrutiny of entrenched managers using
ESOPs; that scrutiny is unlikely to make a big difference.
Instead, those who advocate greater workplace democracy
should focus on working within the market to create more
companies like Demoplace Corp., using existing ESOP law
to the extent it helps.
I. THE IssuE
A. Factual background
Congress began to encourage ESOPs in 1974.13 It took
14
some time, but by the eighties many firms used ESOPs.
Companies use ESOPs both as an employee benefit and as
a form of corporate finance. A trust is established containing shares of a company's stock held for the benefit of some
of the company's workers. A committee or a trustee (or
both) is established to manage and vote the trust's shares.
Frequently, managers of the company run those committees. Although the trust can-and in some circumstances
"3 See BLASI, supra note 6, at 18-19.
14 See BLASI & KRUSE, supra note 5, at 11, 23.
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must-vote according to directions from the employees for
whose benefits the shares are held, many times the trust
instead votes based on the judgment of those running the
trust. Here a potential conflict of interest arises: company
managers supposedly manage the trust for the benefit of
the employees, yet when the ESOP's vote is potentially decisive, they often have a strong self-interest in how the
trust votes.
The structure of the defendant company in Grindstaffv.
Green 5 provides a good example. An ESOP Administrative
Committee directs the ESOP Trustee how to vote the
shares of North American Corporation (NAC) stock that the
Trust held.' 6 The ESOP Administrative Committee has
three members. The five-member NAC Board of Directors
chooses two; the United Textile Workers of America union
recommends the other. 17 The members of the NAC Board,
in turn, are chosen by a vote of NAC's shareholders 1 -- and
the ESOP Trust controls 85 percent of NAC's stock. The
NAC Board chooses a majority of the ESOP Administrative
Committee, and that Committee in turn controls the vote
for a majority of the NAC Board members. One sees how
entrenchment might occur. Since 1985, Charles Green,
president of North American Rayon Corporation (NAR),' 9
and Tony Butts, the vice-president, have been members of
the NAR Board and the ESOP Trust Administrative Committee, and they have been members of the NAC Board
since its creation in 1990.20 Surprise, surprise.
What should happen when the employees of a company
like NAR/NAC, or Managers, Inc., sue, claiming that in
voting for themselves the company's managers have violated their fiduciary duty under ERISA? That is our ques133 F.3d 416 (6th Cir. 1998).
16 See id.
17 At the time of the lawsuit that member was Karl Grindstaff, the
15

plaintiff who lent his name to the case. See id at n. 3.
One of the five NAC Board positions is nominated by employees.
18
See id. at 419.
19 NAC's main subsidiary.
20 See Grindstaff,133. F. 3d at 418.
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tion for this paper. Next we turn to the general legal background of this issue.
B. Legal background
The tax code and ERISA largely constitute the federal
law encouraging and regulating ESOPs. 21 Of particular
interest is the portion of ERISA that defines fiduciary duties.
By regulating ESOPs through ERISA, Congress has chosen to treat them as a form of employee benefit. ERISA
was created to ensure that those running employee benefit
programs would handle them carefully and responsibly, so
that retired workers would not find themselves deprived of
retirement benefits they had counted on because the company's fund had gone under. One important part of ERISA
imposes relatively strict fiduciary duties for those administering ERISA programs. The fiduciary duties are largely
drawn from the common law of trusts, although they are
somewhat modified.22
ESOPs are exempted from many of the normal ERISA
rules, however. ESOP investments need not be as diversified as other ERISA programs must be; 23 prudent invest-

ment rules are relaxed; prohibited transaction rules are
loosened.24 And some general ERISA provisions are less
appropriate when applied to ESOPs. Most importantly,
ERISA fiduciaries may also be officers or agents of a party
of interest.2 Indeed, it is quite common for those directing

21

For summaries of the law governing ESOPs, see BLASI, supra

note 6, ch. 2, The ESOP's Moving Parts 31-62 and Appendix A, Federal
Tax Questions for ESOPs 253-56; Henry L. Blackiston IH et al., ESOPs:
What They Are and How They Work, 45 Bus. LAWYER 85 (1989).
22 See Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA's Fundamental
Contradiction:' The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CH. L. REv. 1105
(1988).
23 See 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (a)(2) (1996).
24

25

See 29 U.S.C.§§ 1107(b)(1), 1104(a)(2) (1996).
See 29 U.S.C. § 1108(c)(3) (1996).
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an ESOP trust to also be officers of the company.2 6 The conflict of interest which this provision allows is more severe
when the fiduciary controls the sponsoring company's own
shares, as in an ESOP.
It is no great mystery why Congress exempted ESOPs
from many of the main ERISA protections. By investing in
the sponsoring company's own stock, ESOPs of necessity
are in severe tension with one of ERISA's main objectives.
ERISA aims to make investment in trusts for workers productive yet safe. Assuring that money will be available to
pay promised benefits is a primary goal. Yet, ESOPs by
their nature are too risky to fit well with this goal. An
ESOP is not diversified-it invests in the stock of just one
company. And that company is the very one in which the
beneficiaries work, putting them at serious risk should that
company run into trouble, since they would lose their job
and their investment at the same time.2 7
Moreover, the kind of conservative decision-making expected of trust fiduciaries is in tension with the more risktaking approach typical of a successful business concern.
Courts have recognized this in the standard business judgment rule of corporate law. 28 Where an ESOP has a controlling interest in a company, binding its trustees to the
more conservative approach could put the company at a
serious disadvantage when up against less constrained
competitors. Furthermore, Congress meant to promote
ESOPs as a form of corporate finance, 29 and managers
might be less likely to use ESOPs, as opposed to other
forms of finance, were they forced to relinquish control of
the funds to other fiduciary trustees.

See Grindstaff, 133 F.3d at 422 (citing Matthew M. O'Toole, The
DisproportionateEffects of an ESOP's ProportionalVoting, 24 Nw. U. L.
REV. 824, 826 (1991)).
27 See Fischel & Langbein, supra note 22, at 1156; William R.
Levin, The False Promise of Worker Capitalism: Congress and the
Leveraged Employee Stock Ownership Plan,95 YALE L.J. 148, 168 (1985).
' See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 7, at 99-100.
29 See BLASI, supra note 6, at 22-23.
26
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Still, ERISA does impose some fiduciary restraints on
ESOPs. ESOP fiduciaries must discharge their duties
"solely in the interest of the participants and
beneficiaries."'3 ° Also, a fiduciary may not "deal with the
assets of the plan in his own interest.' 1 Our question in
section III will be: how do these provisions apply to officers
of companies controlled by ESOPs?
The other main source of federal law affecting ESOPs is
the tax code. Various tax provisions provide incentives to
form ESOPs. 32 Both the interest and the principal used to

fund leveraged ESOPs are deductible.3 3 Company contributions to an ESOP are deductible.' Lenders making loans to
an ESOP may deduct 50 percent of the interest earned.35 A
variety of other, smaller inducements are sprinkled
throughout the tax code. Though it is easy to exaggerate
how much the code encourages ESOPs as opposed to other
forms of employee benefit programs, it does give ESOPs
somewhat favored status.
The tax code imposes some limitations on how ESOPs
may be structured to receive these advantages. Of particular interest here is how the code treats voting rights of
ESOP stock. One must distinguish between allocated and
unallocated stock. Allocated stock is stock that has already
vested in an individual employee. When an ESOP is created, a certain percentage of the company's stock is immediately put in the control of the ESOP. But at first no individual employee necessarily has a right to any of that stock.
Employees gradually receive a vested right to a certain
amount of stock, depending on how long they have been
with the firm and according to the vesting schedule defined
in the ESOP plan. At first, however, much of the stock may
30
31
32

29 U.S.C. § 1104(a).
29 U.S.C. § 1106(b)(1) (1996).
See BLASI, supra note 6, at 253-56; Blackiston et. al., supra note

21, at 102-10.
33 See I.R.C. § 404(a)(9).

In a leveraged ESOP the ESOP Trust
takes out a loan to pay for the shares it receives.
3
See I.R.C. § 404(a)(3).
35 See I.R.C. § 133.
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not be vested (it is unallocated); over time, more stock becomes allocated.36
The tax code does not direct voting rights over unallocated stock.37 For allocated stock, though, it requires "pass
through" voting in certain circumstances. Once an employee has vested rights to some shares of stock, that employee must be able to direct how those shares vote under
some circumstances. For publicly traded firms, allocated
shares must have pass through voting for all votes.3 8 But,
for closely held corporations, pass through voting is required only for fundamental corporate changes, such as
There have been attempts to require pass
mergers.3
through voting on all votes in closely held corporations, and
to require proportional voting for unallocated shares, but
those attempts have failed.4 0 Ninety percent of all ESOPs
that control more than four percent of a company are not in
publicly traded companies. This group comprises 60% of all
employees who own shares in ESOPs.41 Additionally, in
most of those non-public companies the ESOPs do not allow
pass through voting. Thus, ESOPs without pass through
voting are the norm.
II. THE CASES
Let us make the issue more concrete by considering
what happened in the reported cases, starting with Grindstaff. In 1985, the North American Rayon Corporation
(NAR) faced economic hardship. After some hard bargaining, the United Textile Workers of America (UTWA) agreed
to wage concessions. In return, NAR remained in business
See O'Toole, supranote 26, at 827-28.
7 See Blackiston, supranote 21, at 95.
38 See I.R.C. § 409(e)(2).
31 See I.R.C. § 409(e)(3).
40 See BLASI, supra note 6, at 161-63. Under proportional voting,
unallocated shares are voted following the same proportion as the votes
of allocated shares.
41 See BLASI & KRUSE,'supra note 5, at 11.
36
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and set up an ESOP which controls 85 percent of NAR's
stock.42 An ESOP Trust holds the employees' stock for their
benefit. In 1990 NAR formed a holding company called
North American Corporation (NAC). NAC stock replaced
43
the NAR stock as the stock held by the ESOP Trust.

In 1991, employees and the union requested that the
ESOP Trust institute "pass through voting." They filed a
lawsuit attempting to force the ESOP to adopt that system.
The lawsuit settled without the workers achieving pass
through voting, though they did succeed in getting a worker
representative added to the NAC Board, and in requiring
that two of the other NAC Board members be outside directors.' In another shocker, these two outsiders turned out
to be friends and associates of NAR's top managers. 5 Pass
through voting was again an issue in the 1994 labor negotiations. The NAC Board refused to agree to a change in
the by-laws, claiming its lenders would reject the proposal.
In response, the UTWA launched a two-month strike.
When that failed to make NAC back down, workers and the
46
union sued in federal court.

The suit named both individual directors, NAC, and
NAR as corporate entities. It claimed that both the NAC
Board's appointment of the ESOP Committee's members
and the Committee's direction of the vote for the NAC
Board, as well as the NAC Board's rejection of pass through
voting, violated fiduciary duties mandated under ERISA.47
The basic theory was that NAR's managers used their control of the ESOP Trust to entrench their own position in the
42

See Grindstaff, 133 F.3d at 418, 426-27

41

See id.

(Krupansky, J.,
dissenting). Management controls the remaining 15 percent. See id. at
418.
44
'
46

See id. at 419 & n.5.
See id. at 428 (Krupansky, J., dissenting).
See id. at 419.
47 See id. More precisely, in an uncontested election such as this
one, the claim must be that the board members violated their fiduciary
duty in nominating themselves, or perhaps in blocking the nomination of
others. Once they are nominated, the ESOP could hardly vote for anyone
else, especially where company bylaws limit write-in candidacies.
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company, although approving pass through voting would
have been in the better interest of the employee owners to
whom they owed a duty of loyalty. The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim under Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
and 12(c). 48 The Sixth Circuit af49
firmed by a 2-to-i vote.
The majority opinion in Grindstaff saw the decisive
question as whether the ESOP stock voting rights were a
"plan asset."50 ERISA's prohibition on interested transactions says a fiduciary shall not "deal with the assets of the
plan in his own interest. "5 The court phrases the issue in
two somewhat different ways. At first the court says that
"whether or not Plaintiffs have stated an ERISA claim in
this case turns, as an initial matter, on whether 'stock voting rights' constitute an ERISA 'plan asset'."52 However,
the court goes on to add "[m]ore specifically, the issue is
whether the right to vote ESOP shares in a regular annual
election of the corporate board of directors for the purpose
of electing plan fiduciaries to the corporate board
consti53
ERISA.
of
meaning
the
within
asset'
'plan
a
tutes
Throughout the opinion, it remains rather unclear exactly which of these two questions the court is answering.
The answer to that determines how broad the holding is.
Has the Sixth Circuit held there is no fiduciary duty whenever an ESOP trustee votes ESOP stock, or only more narrowly that voting in a regular, uncontested board election is
not subject to such a duty?
The court begins its analysis by noting that Congress
specifically allowed corporate managers to serve as ESOP
fiduciaries, and that in practice this is the rule rather than
the exception. The opinion also stresses that Congress in-

48

See id. at 418; Grindstaff v. Green, 946 F.Supp. 540, 555 (E.D.

Tenn. 1996).
41 See id. at 426.
50 See Grindstaff, 133 F.3d at 420.
51 29 U.S.C. § 1106(b) (emphasis added).
52 Id. (emphasis in original).
53 Id.
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tended to promote the creation of ESOPs and remove obstacles that might limit their use.54
The court then moves on to discuss the two earlier district court cases, O'Neill and Newton. The Grindstaff majority followed the logic of the district court below, which
described both O'Neill and Newton as involving "entrenchment plus,"55 as they did not involve simple uncontested
board elections. There were control disputes in those cases,
but not in Grindstaff.56 It is unclear whether the Sixth Circuit simply distinguishes the two prior cases on this
ground, or disagrees with their analysis-it also says that
the O'Neill and Newton courts "without any clear analysis,
summarily 57treated the right to vote the ESOP shares as a
plan asset.

The court's language wobbles back and forth between
the broader and the narrower holding. In its final statement of its position, the court says "we cannot say that the
mere voting of an ESOP's stock by incumbent directors to
perpetuate their own incumbency constitutes a breach of an
ERISA fiduciary's duty in the handling of a 'plan asset."58
This sounds like the broad version. But the next sentence
continues, "[p]ut another way, the right to vote, or direct
the voting of an ESOP's shares, even when used to perpetrate (sic) 59 one's own incumbency, does not, by itself, con-

stitute a plan asset. '60 That, "by itself' suggests the possibility of the narrower "entrenchment plus" approach. In
particular, the court may leave open the possibility that
where a board election is contested, a fiduciary duty may
apply.

55
56

See id. at 421-22.
Grindstaff, 946 F.Supp. at 550.

See Grindstaff, 133 F.3d at 424. This claim is factually dubious,

at least vis-h-vis Newton, where there was no alternative slate in the
board election.
57 Id. at 422.
58 Id. at 425.
59 Note, their word choice is presumably a typograhpical error.
6 id.
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In O'Neill v. Davis,6 ' the former CEO of Lester B. Knight
and Assoc., Inc. sued after he was removed from the board
and fired by a 90 percent ESOP-owned company. Each
member of the board of trustees was also a trustee of the
Employee Stock Ownership Trust. The members of the
board other than the CEO, acting as ESOP trustees, voted
to reconstitute the board, and did not re-elect the CEO. The
board then fired him. The former CEO claimed his fellow
trustees violated their fiduciary duty under ERISA by voting to further their own interests. 2
In analyzing this claim, the court focused on ERISA's
definition of a fiduciary as one who "exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of such plan or exercises any authority or control
respecting management or disposition of its assets. 63 The
court emphasized that the statute refers to management or
disposition of plan assets. It inferred that the fiduciary
duty does not extend merely to investment decisions, but
also covers the exercise of control over assets.' Exercise of
control over the stocks owned as an asset includes choosing
how to vote that stock. The court looked to principles of
trust law, and found that the fiduciary duty there extends
to voting on stock shares held in trust.65 It held that the
plaintiff had stated a claim under ERISA.66 However, it is
vague as to what it takes to state a claim on this theory. It
appears to hold that so long as the complaint states that the
ESOP trustees voted to further their own personal interests, that suffices to state a claim.67 If so, the decision indeed conflicts with Grindstaff,and makes it easy to state a
claim. Of course, it may not be easy to prove that claimthe court gives no hint as to what would constitute
61
62

721 F.Supp. 1013 (N.D. I. 1989).

This demonstrates that not only workers can brandish the

fiduciary duty against ESOP trustees.
63 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(i).
See O'Neill, 721 F.Supp. at 1015.

6s See id.
6
67

See id. at 1016.
See id. at 1015-16.
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e court gives no hint as to what would constitute adequate
proof of a breach of fiduciary duty.
In Newton v. Van Otterloo,8 an ESOP held 81 percent of
the stock in South Bend Lathe, Inc. In a proxy fight over
re-election of the management-dominated board, the similarly management-dominated ESOP Committee decided not
to solicit the votes of ESOP retirees. As a result, 70 percent
of the ESOP's shares were not voted, and the votes of the
incumbent management were enough to re-elect the board
and to create a staggered board with three-year terms for
directors. The court followed O'Neill in holding that a fiduciary duty applies in deciding how to vote ESOP stock.69 It
applied the Seventh Circuit's three prong test from Leigh v.
Engle7" for deciding whether a plan fiduciary has violated
the duty of loyalty. Under that test, a court must ask:
(1) whether the conflict of interests is so great
that it is virtually impossible for the fiduciary
to discharge the duties with an eye single to
the beneficiaries' interests, and
(2) if not, whether the fiduciary engaged in an
intensive and independent investigation of
options to ensure that the action taken was in
the beneficiaries' best interests, and
(3) the extent to which the use of the trust's
assets tracked the best interest of another
71
party.
The Newton court held that the ESOP trustees did not
violate the first prong, but they violated the second prong
because they did not engage in an "intensive and scrupulous independent investigation of their options. 7 2 It would
appear that the trustees must make this intensive investigation before any potentially self-interested decision, in68
69

70
71
72

756 F.Supp. 1121 (N.D. Ind. 1991).
See id. at 1128.
727 F.2d 113 (7th Cir.1984).
Newton, 756 F.Supp. at 1127.
Id. at 1129.
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cluding any decision to elect themselves to the board. The
court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs against
the trustees, even though it saw much force in the argument that a vote against the management slate, with no
alternative presented, would have caused corporate chaos.
Judge Krupansky dissented from the majority in Grindstaff. He thought that the complaint alleged enough to
state a claim. Following the analysis in O'Neill and Newton, he argued that although ERISA fiduciary duties do
generally focus on the investment of plan assets, they also
apply to the management of such assets. His analysis of
"asset" is more detailed than that of the majority, commending the general approach of the Ninth Circuit in Kayes
v. Pacific Lumber Co.,74 which holds an item is an asset if it
"may be used to the benefit (financial or otherwise) of the
fiduciary at the expense of plan participants or beneficiaries."'
"

He also pointed to the common law of trusts, where

voting shares of stock are subject to fiduciary restrictions.76
Judge Krupansky also noted that the United States Department of Labor had filed an amicus brief arguing there
should be a fiduciary duty limiting how a trustee may vote
a plan's stock shares. The dissent argued this position is
due deference under Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense
Council.7 The majority noted the Department's position
but made no reference to Chevron. 8
Finally, Judge Krupansky argued that if one understands the majority as recognizing there may be a duty in
the "entrenchment plus" situation, then the majority
reached the wrong result in this case. The complaint alleged that the defendants "used their voting power to perpetuate contractual and lease agreements between NAC,
NAR, and other businesses the individual directors
73

See id. at 431.

74

See id. at 432.

Id. (citing Kayes v. Pacific Lumber Co., 51 F.3d 1449, 1467 (9th
Cir. 1995)).
716 See id.
75

7

78

See id. at 432-33.
See id. at 424.
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owned."' 9 Krupansky argued that this should count as the
"plus." Again, the majority does not respond to this argument.
III. DOCTRINAL CONSIDERATIONS
This section III considers the correct interpretation of
ERISA law as it stands using the standard tools of statutory interpretation. This section is a precursor to the paper's main object: a policy analysis of the issues raised.
This paper addresses how well ESOPs function and how
well they serve their purposes, whether the law governing
ESOPs need to be reformed and whether the courts' resolutions of the issue help or hurt matters. Before proceeding to
that analysis, though, I engage in a more traditional statutory analysis, looking at statutory language and structure,
legislative history and purpose, fiduciary duty in the control
transaction context, and the Department of Labor's position.
A. Statutory language and structure
The various provisions of ERISA interact in a not particularly clear way. What doctrinal analysis makes as
much sense as possible of these provisions taken together
as a whole, applied in circumstances where ESOP managers entrench themselves.
There are four main sections of interest.
Section
1002(21) defines a "fiduciary. ' 80 Section 1104 sets the fiduciary standard of care. 81 Section 1106 defines prohibited
transactions between plans and fiduciaries. 82 Section 1108
allows corporate managers to serve as fiduciaries. 83
Section 1002(21) defines a person as a fiduciary "to the
extent (i) he exercises any discretionary authority or discreId. at 433.
80 See 29 U.S.C.
8' See 29 U.S.C.
82
See 29 U.S.C.
83 See 29 U.S.C.
79

§ 1002(21).
§ 1104.

§ 1106.
§ 1108.
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tionary control respecting management of such plan or exercises any authority or control respecting management or
disposition of its assets."' 4 The Grindstaff court took as decisive whether the right to vote the ESOP's shares, under
the circumstances of the case, was a plan asset and found
that it was not
The court could have framed its inquiry differently.
Rather than ask whether the right to vote the stock was an
asset, it could have asked whether the stock itself was a
plan asset. Since it surely was, the court would then have
asked whether in voting for directors the trust was managing that asset. This is the more natural way of framing
the inquiry. The O'Neill and Newton courts and Judge
Krupansky's dissent in Grindstaff basically followed this
more natural route by stressing the disjunctive "management or disposition" of plan assets." Deciding how to vote
one's shares is one part of managing those shares. Grindstaff is rather puzzling, looked at this way.
Note though that Grindstaff,unlike the other two cases,
concerns two different sets of actions. One was the ESOP
Trust's decision to vote its shares in favor of the incumbent
board. The previous paragraph suggests that as the
ESOP's shares are clearly a plan asset, and voting those
shares is part of managing that asset, this action falls
within the scope of the fiduciary duty. A second action was
the NAC board opposing pass through voting. This was an
ordinary business decision of the company's board. NAC
itself is not a plan asset, so managing NAC does not fall
within the fiduciary duty's scope. Thus, Grindstaff seems
better justified with respect to the board's action, as opposed to the Trust's. The distinction is not purely academic
either-some defendants were both NAC board members
and ESOP Administrative Committee members, but others
were just board members.86 Under the interpretation just
29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(i).
See Grindstaff, 133 F.3d at 431 (Krupansky, J., dissenting);
O'Neill, 721 F.Supp. at 1015; Newton, 756 F.Supp. at 1128.
86
See Grindstaff,133 F.3d at 418.
85
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suggested, the defendants who only served on the NAC
board should be free from liability.
Returning to the actions of ESOP trustees, section 1108
lends the strongest support to Grindstaffs interpretation of
ERISA. Fiduciaries may also be officers or employees of the
company.8

Since the law contemplates this dual role, it is

difficult to contend that directors violate the laws simply by
telling the trust to vote for themselves? Even if one accepted this position, though, the law would perhaps be better stated by saying not that the right to vote the stock under such circumstances is not a plan asset, but rather that
voting in one's favor does not, in itself, violate the fiduciary
duty. This would avoid the apparent awkwardness of
Grindstaffs position (on the narrower interpretation of its
holding) that the right to vote the stock in an uncontested
board election is not a plan asset, while perhaps the right to
vote in a contested election is a plan asset.8
Moreover, it is questionable that voting the stock in an
uncontested election while managing a plan asset will not
violate a fiduciary duty. While section 1108 allows managers to direct an ESOP to vote for themselves, section 1104
still requires that the decision of how to vote must be
"solely in the interest of the participants and
beneficiaries. 89 While managers may vote for themselves,
courts should subject such a decision to higher scrutiny because of the potential for self-interested voting. Such a
standard of review would harmonize the various sections.
Perhaps the dispute here is-or should really be-about
prima facie cases and the burden of production. We should
interpret Grindstaff as holding that merely producing evidence of managers directing an ESOP to vote for themselves does not adequately state a claim of fiduciary duty
violation. Plaintiffs must produce evidence of more than
just managers voting for themselves, since section 1108(c)
contemplates that. Although a fiduciary duty does still ap87
88

See 29 U.S.C. § 1108(c)(3).
See Grindstaff,133 F.3d at 422-23.

29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1).
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ply to this decision, as to all decisions in managing a plan
asset, the law requires more of a showing of conflict of interest in order to find a violation of that duty-"entrenchment plus."90 What exactly that more might be is hard to
discern from Grindstaff. Judge Krupansky's dissent suggests that the plaintiffs did plead entrenchment plus, but
he is vague as to what they pleaded, and the majority does
not engage the dissent on this point.9' Egregious conflicts of
interest would do the trick, but what lesser allegations
might state a claim? One possibility is that officers directing a vote for themselves in a contested board election
would be enough to shift the burden to defendants to show
a thorough investigation or fairness to the company.
Grindstaffleaves open this possibility, at least on the narrow interpretation of its holding.
Newton and O'Neill probably stand for an alternative
position: showing an officer has directed an ESOP trust
vote for himself presents a prima facie case of violation of
the fiduciary duty. The defendant must then produce evidence showing there was no conflict of interests. This
might be evidence of an independent investigation of the
options, or that the managers did not track too closely their
own self-interest as opposed to the trust beneficiaries' interest. 92 This position is consistent with section 1108managers are not prohibited from being fiduciaries;
however, they must show that they have not violated their
fiduciary duty in voting for themselves.9 3
Defining the conflict around the burden of production
helps clarify what is actually at stake between Grindstaff
and Newton.
Both positions appear consistent with
ERISA's language and structure-indeed, there is not much
See Grindstaff,133 F.3d at 422.
See id. at 433 (Krupansky, J., dissenting).
9
See Newton, 756 F.Supp. at 1128; Leigh, 727 F.2d at 127.
93 Note that if simply producing evidence of better available
directors can count as the "plus" of the "entrenchment plus" approach,
then the two positions differ only in who they require to initially plead
and produce evidence as to the relative qualifications of board
90
91

candidates.
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reason to prefer one over the other on these grounds. This
approach also seems to shrink the difference between the
two sides. Each finds that an ERISA fiduciary duty applies
when ESOP trustees elect themselves to a company's board.
Each nonetheless agrees that such a self-interested vote
does not necessarily breach that duty, and that further evidence must be reviewed. They differ only on who has the
burden of producing evidence once it is shown that trustees
have voted for themselves.
Practically, though, the difference will be significant. If
managers face the potential threat of having to affirmatively justify their decision every time they direct an ESOP
to vote for themselves, that might deter them from doing so
more often, or induce them to do more to cover themselves
in case their decision is questioned. How big the difference
is depends on how much more a plaintiff must show under
the "entrenchment plus" approach to state a claim. If it is
not much more, the two positions are not so different and
plaintiffs would then usually be able to easily state a claim
thereby putting the burden on trustees to justify their decisions.
B. Legislative purpose and history
Since the statutory language and structure are consistent with two rather different approaches, many (though
not all) jurists would look to legislative purpose, history,
and intent to provide guidance.94 In this instance, as in
most instances, I am aware of no evidence of legislative intent on the specific issue in question. There is, though,
some relevant evidence from legislative history as to Congress's purpose in creating ESOP law.
Although ESOPs have been alleged to fulfill many purposes, chief among them is that of broadening ownership of
capital within a capitalist system. Louis Kelso stressed this

94

See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:

FEDERAL

COURTS AND THE LAw 29-37 (1997) (arguing Justice Scalia would be
skeptical).
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goal in the initial work advocating ESOPs. 95 Kelso converted Senator Russell Long to the cause, and Long became
the chief advocate of ESOPs in Congress.9 6 Kelso continued
both to lobby Congress and to develop ESOPs in practice
through the investment bank he set up, Kelso and Com97
pany
Other benefits alleged for ESOPs include encouraging
capital formation through an improved form of finance, improved management-labor relations, and increased productivity. 98 Increasing worker control in the workplace has
apparently not been a major Congressional goal. Indeed, it
would be surprising to find Congress pursuing a relatively
radical change in the corporate power structure of this
country through relatively little debated and obscure sections of the tax code and ERISA.
At several points, persons in the executive branch tried
to change ESOP law to give participants more control over
ESOP fiduciaries, fearing managerial entrenchment. In
1976 the Department of the Treasury and the Department
of Labor issued proposed regulations calling for independent third-party trustees and voting rights in leveraged
ESOPs. 99
Congress attacked the proposed regulations,
saying,
The Act reaffirms Congressional intent
with respect to employee stock ownership
plans and expresses concern that adninistrative rules and regulations may frustrate
Congressional intent. In this connection it
has come to the attention of the Congress
that proposed regulations issued by both
the Department of Treasury and the Department of Labor on July 30, 1976, may
make it virtually impossible for ESOPs,
95

See

Louis KELSO, THE

CAPITALIST MANIFESTO (1958).

98

See BLASI, supra note 6, at 7.
See id. at 22-23, 134.
See id. at 18-28.

9

See id. at 153.

96

97
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and especially leveraged ESOPs, to be established and to function effectively.'0e
The proposed regulations were withdrawn.
In 1985 the Treasury Department suggested, as part of
the tax reform project, that workers must have all the
rights of direct ownership, including the ability to elect directors, in order for the company to receive the tax benefits
of ESOPs. Senator Long objected to the proposed changes
as likely to discourage the creation of ESOPs. Congress did
not make the changes.10'
This history suggests that Congress has tried to promote
widespread use of ESOPs. It has advocated worker ownership, but not worker control of the firms they partially or
totally own. Measures which bolster worker rights over the
ESOPs, but which might discourage managers from adopting such ESOPs, have not received support. Where the
statutory language supports two plausible interpretations,
the legislative history this appears to favor that position
which burdens company management less. This, then, is
an argument for the position that evidence of managers
voting to entrench themselves on the board is not on its own
sufficient to state a claim under ERISA's fiduciary duties.
Indeed, the Grindstaffcourt points to some of this legislative history and purpose.' °2
C. Fiduciary duties in the control transaction context
Another area to look for guidance is the standard common law of fiduciary duty for corporate directors and officers. ERISA was enacted against a common law background, and in part codifies that law.103 Of particular interest is the law in the context of hostile takeover attempts.
The managers of takeover targets, like managers who con'oD
101

See id.

See id. at 154-57.

See Grindstaff,133 F.3d at 421-22.
See O'Neill, 721 F.Supp. at 1015; Firestone Tire and Rubber Co.
v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989).
'02
103
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trol an ESOP Trust, occupy an intermediate ground. In
both, there is reason to fear a conflict of interest, as managers have incentive to entrench their own positions, whether
or not that is in the company's best interests. Yet, in both
there is also reason to be cautious of courts becoming overly
involved in second-guessing managerial decisions, as retaining incumbent managers may often be in the company's
best interests and courts are not too good at telling when
incumbent managers should or should not be encouraged to
stay.
Subsection A above spoke vaguely of the "fiduciary duty"
generally. Yet, legal commentators differentiate between
the duty of care and the business judgment rule, on the one
hand, and the duty of loyalty on the other. °4 In most circumstances, the weaker duty of care applies to corporate
directors, along with the associated business judgment rule.
So long as a board's decision was made in a good faith belief
that it serves the company's best interests, and so long as
the board was reasonably diligent in deliberating before
acting, courts will not second-guess corporate actions. °5
However, where some of the directors have conflicting interests-e.g., where the corporation does business with another company owned by one of the directors-courts will
apply stricter scrutiny under the duty of loyalty. 10 6 Where
this duty applies, courts will not ratify a board's decision
unless it is approved by a majority of informed, disinterested directors, approved by a majority of informed, disinterested shareholders, or is fair to the corporation.10 7
Even when there are no conflicting interests, courts may
not give boards and officers a free pass. In the famous case
of Smith v. Van Gorkom,10 8 the Delaware Supreme Court
announced that if directors do not carefully inspect the details of an acquisition, they may be held liable. To get the
'04 See DENIS J. BLOCK ET.

AL., THE

BusiNEss

JUDGMENT RULE:

FIDuCIARY DUTiEs OF CoRPoRATE DIRECTORS (5th ed. 1998).
105 See id. at 5.
106 See id. at 262.
1o7 See id.
103 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
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benefit of the business judgment rule, a board's judgment
must be informed. Though Van Gorkom caused quite a
commotion, its impact has been limited. Many states, including Delaware, passed laws allowing companies to limit
director and officer liability, and many companies took advantage of those laws.' °9 Few cases since have found director liability based on a failure to become informed." ° Still,
the decision may have induced boards to take prophylactic
measures to avoid liability.
Most of the time the business judgment rule is appropriate. However, sometimes out-and-out conflicts of interest
require duty of loyalty analysis; managers faced with a hostile takeover threat fall in-between. The interest of incumbent managers in retaining control may conflict with the
best interest of the corporation, but then again, rejecting
the suitor may be in the corporation's long-term interest."'
Frequently there will be good arguments on both sides.
What is a court to do? What Delaware courts, which have
created most of the case law in this area, have done is create a juiced-up version of the business judgment rule. The
key case, Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Corp.," created a
two-pronged test for evaluating defensive actions taken to
combat a hostile takeover. First, directors "must show they
had reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed."113 Second, the defensive mechanism "must be reasonable in relationship to
the threat posed.""

As formulated in later cases, particu-

larly Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp,." 5 defensive
mechanisms will fail this second prong only if they are quite
disproportional indeed. "[Tihe law affords boards of directors substantial latitude in defending the perimeters of the
109 See
10

BLOCK, supranote 104, at 226-41.

See id. at 167.

" Note that the same can be said for managers of ESOP-controlled
companies.
112 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
113

Id.

,,4See id.
115 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995).
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corporate bastion against perceived threats."' 16 This case,
to some extent like Van Gorkom, imposes something more
than the normal, easygoing business judgment rule, but
less than the strict duty of loyalty, in situations where there
is concern about the incentives that directors face. As with
Van Gorkom, defendants generally win under Unocal, and a
wide variety of effective anti-takeover mechanisms have
proliferated. Nonetheless, the case has probably forced
boards to take some measures to assure their decisions are
informed and defensible, and the most extreme antitakeover mechanisms have been struck down.17 This, then,
is a model of limited judicial involvement, but not total abdication.
The logic of Unocal can be extended to ESOPs. Indeed,
it has been in cases where boards impose ESOPs in response to a takeover threat.'1 8 Beyond that, though, courts
could find a duty of heightened inquiry in some instances
where an ESOP is already in place. For instance, where
there is a contested board race, perhaps incumbent directors and officers should have to show diligent investigation
and a reasonable relationship between their vote and the
interests of beneficiaries before courts approve voting for
themselves. Does an uncontested board election create a
similar need for heightened scrutiny? The Delaware takeover case law analogy suggests that in deciding where to
draw the line in invoking somewhat heightened scrutiny,
and in shaping what that scrutiny will look like, we must
balance the risks of managerial conflicts of interest and
limited judicial competence.
D. The Department of Labor and Chevron
In Grindstaff,the Department of Labor filed an amicus
brief urging the Sixth Circuit to hold that voting rights are
Id. at 1388 n. 38.
"1 See Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quickturn Design Systems, Inc.,
(Del. Ch.Dec. 2, 1998)
11' See Eric Grannis, Note, A Problem of Mixed Motive: Applying
Unocal to Defensive ESOPs, 92 CoLuM. L. REV. 851 (1992).
116
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a plan asset. The Grindstaffmajority simply replied "[w]e
decline this invitation to so broad a declaration.""' 9 Judge
Krupansky's dissent suggests, though, that the Department's position is due deference under Chevron v. Natural
Resources Defense Council.'2 0 Under that case, on a matter
of statutory interpretation the court should first look to
whether the statutory language unambiguously settles the
issue. If it does, that is an end to it. If not, and if the executive agency in charge of administering the statute has
offered an interpretation, the court should then examine
the agency's position. If that interpretation is reasonable,
the court should defer to it. 121
We have seen that ERISA's language fairly counts as
ambiguous, at least as between the two positions described
in subsection III.A above, namely entrenchment-plus versus
simple entrenchment as triggering a shift to the defendant
of the burden of production. The Sixth Circuit should thus
have proceeded to Chevron's second step.121 Several questions arise here. First, is the Department of Labor entrusted with administering ERISA? Apparently, yes. In
ERISA Congress authorized the Secretary of Labor to "prescribe such regulations as he finds necessary or appropriate
to carry out the provisions of this subchapter.' 2 1 Several
circuits have held that the Department of Labor's interpretations of ERISA are due Chevron deference. 24 I am unaware of any court that has held otherwise.
Second, has the Department taken its position in a form
that is due deference? Not all agency pronouncements are
due deference under Chevron. For instance, where an
"'

Id. at 424.

120

467 U.S. 837 (1984).

121 See id.

The. O'Neill court also received a Department of Labor brief.
Though without discussing Chevron, the O'Neill court followed the
Department's reasoning. See 721 F.Supp. at 1015.
123 29 U.S.C. § 1135.
"2 See Herman v. NationsBank Trust Co. (Georgia), 126 F.3d 1354,
1363 (11th Cir. 1997); Matinchek v. John Alden Life Ins. Co., 93 F.3d 96,
100 (3d Cir. 1996); Bartling v. Fruehauf Corp., 29 F.3d 1062, 1072 (6th
Cir. 1994).
122
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agency is a party and has first adopted its position as a litigating stance in that case, that position is due no special
deference." s Here, the court received an amicus brief.
There is some ground for arguing that an amicus brief
should receive an intermediate amount of deference. At one
end of the spectrum are agency rules reached through notice-and-comment rulemaking, and interpretations reached
as part of formal adjudication. Such decisions are clearly
due full Chevron deference, as in such contexts agencies
have formally deliberated and made policy choices pursuant
to Congressionally mandated procedures. 26 At the other
end are agency positions taken only as defensive positions
in litigation, which are often post-hoc rationalizations
adopted by lawyers to defend their clients.' 27 An amicus
brief falls in-between--it is not adopted following a formal
proceeding, yet it is not taken in response to defensive litigation pressure either. A leading administrative law treatise suggests giving no deference to a position adopted in an
amicus brief.128 Yet the Supreme Court did recently give
deference to a position from an amicus brief.'29 But it did so
stressing that on the facts in that case, "[t]here is simply no
reason to suspect that the interpretation does not reflect
the agency's fair and considered judgment on the matter in
question."'3 ° Several courts have deferred to Department of
Labor positions on ERISA taken in opinion letters. 3 ' The
Sixth Circuit has expressed a sliding scale standard of deference, saying "[t]he degree of deference to be accorded an
agency's interpretation of a statute of Congress has charged
it with administering varies, depending on several factors,

'2

(1988).

See Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital, 488 U.S. 204, 212

126 See

KENNETH

CULl'

AmnmSTRATrvE LAW TREATISE
127

DAvIs

& RICHARD

J.

PIERCE,

§ 3.5.

JR.,

See Bowen, 488 U.S. at 212; CULl & PIERCE supra note 126, at §

3.5.

" See CuLP & PIERCE, supra note 126, at § 3.5.
129See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
130 Id.
131 See Herman, 126 F.3d at 1363; Bartling,29 F.3d at 1072.
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including the existence of a statute mandating a standard
of review, the form and formality of the interpretation, and
the consistency of the agency's interpretation over time."'3
In this case, the Department of Labor has taken the same
position in at least two cases over nine years. How well
reasoned its positions are we cannot say, without the briefs
in front of us.
Finally, even if the Department's position is due deference, has it necessarily answered the question before us?
Grindstaffs holding does seem to conflict with the Department's position. But, we saw in subsection III.A that the
majority's position can, and probably should, be re-cast as
stating that although a fiduciary duty does apply to the act
of casting ESOP shares' votes, merely presenting evidence
of voting in favor of oneself as a director does not adequately state a claim of conflicting interest. Is the Department's position necessarily inconsistent with this version of
Grindstaffs holding? Without the briefs, it is hard to answer that question.
E. Doctrinal wrap-up
The standard tools of statutory interpretation do not
yield a clear answer here. The statutory language and
structure do not provide any clear way of distinguishing
between at least two possible positions. Legislative purpose
and history suggest a restricted reading of the fiduciary
duty. Deference to the agency that administers ERISA
suggests a more aggressive fiduciary duty in the case that
went against the Department of Labor's position, while not
in one of the cases that supported the Department's position.1 33 The common law of fiduciary duty in the takeover
context suggests an intermediate level of scrutiny. Perhaps
the argument so far slightly favors the following position:
although a fiduciary duty applies to all decisions in voting
ESOP stock, merely voting to elect oneself in an
132

133

brief.

Wolpaw v. C.I.R., 47 F.3d 787, 790 (6th Cir. 1995).
There is no sign in Newton that the Department filed an amicus
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uncontested election is not enough to state an ERISA claim.
Plaintiffs must show something more. Perhaps showing
that the election was contested would be enough to state a
claim. Once the plaintiff has stated a claim, the burden
should shift to defendants to show that they engaged in an
independent investigation and that their decision did not
track too closely their own self-interest while diverging
from the interest of the employee-stockholders."' This position follows Grindstaff in demanding entrenchment plus to
trigger a burden shift, but then borrows from Newton and
Leigh as to what managers" must show once that burden
shifts. Still, while a plausible position, the statutory language far from compels it. For those so inclined to consider
policy arguments in close questions, we face a good candidate for doing so.
IV. THE PURPOSES AND EFFECTS OF ESOPs
The next section engages in a comparative institutional
analysis of how well market forces, courts, administrative
agencies, and Congress are likely in constrain ESOPs to
accomplish what we want them to accomplish, and whether
imposing a fiduciary duty is likely to help. First, we must
consider what it is that we want ESOPs to accomplish, and
how close they have come to accomplishing it.

A. Sharing the wealth
Wealth in the United States is highly concentrated.
Many people believe this is unjust both in its own right, and
because it increases political inequality. One of Kelso's
major goals in promoting ESOPs was increasing the equality of wealth by promoting worker ownership of
135
companies.

13
131

See the second and third prongs of Leigh, 727 F.2d at 1127.
See BLASI, supra note 6, at 18-22.
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But using ESOPs to achieve this goal has a huge, oftanalyzed drawback. If more widespread ownership of
wealth is the goal, why should it be ownership of stock in
the same companies that employ the workers? Ownership
of a broad, diversified portfolio would advance the same
goal. It would also come at a significantly lower cost. Less
wealthy employees are likely to be more risk averse than
the more wealthy, and they already have a big stake in the
financial health of the firm where they work. Yet an ESOP
makes their financial well being even more dependent on
bear more risk than if they
that company, forcing them to
13 6
owned a diversified portfolio.

Simply sharing the wealth does not provide much of an
argument for ESOPs as opposed to other ways of increasing
workers' wealth. Nonetheless, wealth sharing seems to
have been the most important motive of those influential in
establishing ESOPs, especially Kelso and Senator Long. 137
B. Capital formation and corporate finance
ESOPs have also been promoted as an alternative form
of corporate finance that can encourage new capital formation. 3 8 Indeed, by lowering the costs of obtaining capital,
ESOPs can encourage companies to invest more. This is
not necessarily so, however. Issuing new stock to workers
dilutes outstanding shares, unless the issue is financed either by employee concessions in wages, other forms of compensation, or by increased productivity and earnings.
Moreover, one must still argue why we should encourage
capital formation through this form of finance, rather than
others. 140 The answer is parasitic on other alleged gains
from ESOPs. The capital formation argument provides no
136 See Fischel & Langbein, supra note 22, at 1156; Levin, supra
note 27, at 168; Richard L. Doernberg & Jonathan R. Macey, ESOPs and
Economic Distortions,23 HARVARD J. ON LEGIS. 103, 133-36 (1986).
13" See KELSO, supra note 95; BLASI, supra note 6, at 18-22.
138 See BLASI, supra note 6, at 22-23.
139 See id. at 65-72.
140 See Doernberg & Macey, supranote 136, at 104-05.

No. 2:1991

ESOPS'FAILURES

independent reason to encourage ESOPs as opposed to
other forms of corporate finance. Indeed, by biasing the tax
system in favor of ESOPs, Congress may well have induced
some firms to choose them where
other forms of financing
14 1
would have been more efficient.
C. Increased efficiency and productivity
Many claim that ESOPs increase productivity. In comparing the efficiency and productivity of employeecontrolled companies with more standard investorcontrolled companies, one must consider a variety of effects.
First, differences in ownership may change the objectives
we can expect companies to pursue. Second, different ownership and control structures may affect the incentives and
motivation of individual employees. Third, employee ownership and control may affect what information companies
are able to use in making decisions.
Economists generally conceive of standard investorowned companies as maximizing the discounted present
value of their expected flow of profit. A company fully
owned by and run for the benefit of its employees would
instead maximize the discounted present value of the flow
of expected returns to its employees. The theoretical economic literature has been concerned with incentives for
worker-owned firms to make inefficient production and
hiring decisions. 4 2 They argue that because worker-owned
companies would maximize average net return rather than
marginal net return, they will not hire workers whom it
would be efficient to hire when the revenue those workers
43
would generate would outweigh the cost of hiring them
because such workers would bring down average profits.' 44
See id.
See John P, Bonin et. al., Theoretical and Empirical Studies of
ProducersCooperative: Will Ever the Twain Meet, 31 J. EcoN. Lrr. 1290,
1297-1302 (1993).
See also Alan Hyde, In Defense of Employee
Ownership, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 159 (1991).
143 In other words, the marginal profit from hiring them is positive.
'4
The seminal article is Benjamin Ward, The Firm in Illyria:
Market Socialism, 48 AMER. ECON. REv. 566 (1958).
141
142
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Essentially, the incumbent workers must share a part of
their profit with the new one, so they choose not to hire
him. It is an interesting theoretical point, but more sophisticated models vitiate it, and the point does not seem borne
out empirically.1 45
Economists have also been concerned with possible incentives to under-invest. 146 They argue that worker-owned
companies will have a shortened time horizon, as some
workers will leave before all the gains fiom an investment
are realized, and hence do not care enough about those future gains. By contrast, owners who leave capitalist firms
get paid the expected future value of the company's profits,
147
and hence have reason to care about that future value.
Again, more sophisticated theoretical models and empirical
evidence suggest the problem has been overblown, as most
employees can expect to be with the company long enough
to capture most of the benefit from investments. An employee's stake in a company can be structured to improve
the incentive, as they are, for instance,
in the producer co148
Spain.
in
Mondragon
of
operatives
More seriously, Henry Hansmann makes some strong
arguments why worker-owned firms often have high decision-making costs. The heterogeneity in most companies of
workers' interests as opposed to the homogeneity of shareholders' interests may make decision-making in employeerun companies much more complicated and costly.

49

This

remains an open question. I suspect that Hansmann overestimates the problem. Decision-making is a problem, but
145 See Bonin et. al., supra note 142, at 1298-1302.
146 See Bonin et. al., supra note 142, at 1307-12; Hyde, supra note
142, at 15.
141 See Erik G. Furobotn, The Long-Run Analysis of the LaborManaged Firm: An Alternative Interpretation,66 AMER. ECON. REV. 104
(1976).
148 See HENK THOMAS & CRIus LOGAN, MONDRAGON:

AN ECONOMIC

ANALYSIS 149-58 (1982).
149 See Henry Hansmann, When Does Worker Ownership Work?
ESOPs, Law Firms, Codeterminationand Economic Democracy, 99 YALE
L.J. 1749 (1990); HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 89-114

(1996).
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companies can structure employee involvement to limit
problems. 5 ' They can use representative government and
limit worker input on decisions where workers are likely to
fight over distributive shares rather than work together to
increase productivity. Indeed, the widely discussed Mondragon cooperatives do so. 15 1 With more experience in employee involvement, companies would learn how to reduce
the cost of involvement while getting the most benefit possible.
On the positive side, employees running a company
would presumably not merely maximize expected financial
return. They would care about other factors as well, e.g.,
workplace safety and creation of a satisfying work environment. Many argue that in the present system such factors are efficiently set by contract and by the labor market.
There is something to that, but it is possible that market
mechanisms do not reflect employee preferences with much
accuracy. Workplace-wide issues may have a semi-public
good quality that can prevent them from being efficiently
priced. Putting it in term of "exit" versus "voice," for many
employees in many circumstances it may be quite costly to
exit a company because they dislike that company's policy
on a particular issue. In such circumstances the threat of
exit alone may not exert much pressure to follow a policy
which reflects the desires of workers. When that occurs,
allowing employees a voice in making policies may lead to
an outcome that better reflects the preferences of all. 5 2
Employee ownership may also affect individual employee incentives and motivation. Some argue that employees who own a share of their firm will feel they have more
'5o See HANSMANN, supra note 149, at 98-103 (recognizing the
structuring of employee involvement to some extent and discussing the
Mondragon cooperatives).
151 See WILLIAM F.
WHYTE & KATHLEEN K. WHYTE, MAKING
MONDRAGON: THE GROWTH AND DYNAMICS OF THE WORKER COOPERATIVE

CoMPLEx 295-96 (2d ed. 1991).
152 See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN,

EXIT,

VOICE, AND LOYALTY:
RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 36-43

(1970).
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to gain from the company's success. Hence they will work
harder and better.15 ' This argument has some problems. In
all but the smallest companies there is a free rider problem-what worker owners should want is for everyone else
to work harder while they reap the benefits. This is especially true where the gains from working better depend on
many people doing better, with the added input of just one
person being small or nonexistent. Even where the increased output from one employee's input exists and is
measurable, the worker has highly imperfect incentives
because that increased output is divided among all the
other owners. A worker bears all the cost of her increased
effort, but gains only a fraction of the benefit. The incentive
to work harder thus becomes
dimmer and dimmer as the
154
larger.
becomes
company
There's a better chance of increasing productivity if
ownership is combined with greater employee control or
involvement in decision-making. 155 Such involvement is
more likely to produce greater attachment to the company.
It also may encourage employee monitoring of other employees, which can help 6overcome the incentive problems of
15
widespread ownership.
Another claimed source of improved productivity and efficiency from employee ownership comes from the potential
for tapping into the huge store of ideas for improvements
that employees build up on the job. Greater employee involvement may allow companies to make use of these
ideas. 57 Employees, with their direct knowledge of what is
going on at work, may be better able to monitor managers
See BLASI, supra note 6, at 25-27.
"s See Martin L. Weitzman & Douglas L. Kruse, Profit Sharing and
Productivity, in PAYING FOR PRODUCTITY 94, 98-100 (Alan S. Blinder
ed., 1990).
153

15
See Michael A. Conte & Jan Svejnar, The PerformanceEffects of
Employee Ownership Plans, in PAYING FOR PRODUCTIVITY 143, 167 (Alan
S. Blinder ed., 1990); BLASI, supranote 6, at 218-19.
156 See Weitzman & Kruse, supra notel54, at 99; Stephen M.
Bainbridge, ParticipatoryManagmenet Within a Theory of the Firm,21 J.
CORP L. 657, 690-696 (1996).
17 See Bainbridge, supra note 136, at 680-90.
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than distant, uninvolved shareholders. Employees also
have better incentive to see that managers do a good job
than do most shareholders. These information-based ideas
are the strongest efficiency arguments in favor of employee
ownership and control.
The empirical literature on ESOPs and worker ownership suggests that ownership alone does little to improve
productivity. While some studies do find improvement,
others do not, and the latter are analytically sounder than
the former.'58 Overall, employee ownership alone at most
increases productivity only a small amount, and even that
small increase is hard to demonstrate. However, employee
ownership combined with efforts to encourage greater employee participation in decision-making does seem to increase productivity significantly.5 9 Ownership and participation seem to interact, producing more of a gain than either one tried separately. The most useful form of participation may well be day-to-day involvement in decisions in
the immediate workplace, rather than occasional voting for
the company-wide board of directors. 60 Such day-to-day
involvement does more to use valuable employee information than does voting for directors. Such shop-level democracy may also have a stronger effect on employee motivation.
The legal structure of ESOPs allows greater employee
participation, but does little to encourage it. As our legal
issue demonstrates, current ESOP law does not necessarily
encourage even democracy at the board level. Worse, ESOP
law does nothing to encourage democracy at the shop or
office level. Most ESOPs so far have done little or nothing
to increase worker participation. 16' Thus, if greater productivity and efficiency are the goals that support ESOPs, the
158

See Conte & Svejnar, supranote 155, at 167.

159

See id.

Thus, the union in Grindstaff not only may have been mistaken
in going to court, but also, perhaps, it should have focused on other forms
160

of employee participation.
161 See BLASI, supra note 6, at 241; BLASI & KRUSE, supra note 5, at
216; Levin, supranote 27, at 250.
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law seems in need of an overhaul. We should only encourage with tax breaks those ESOPs that involve some degree
of employee control. That does not necessarily mean that
courts should be involved in enforcing a fiduciary duty in
cases where employees lack that control.
Thus, there are some theoretical and empirical arguments for potential efficiency gains from employee ownership and control, though plenty of arguments on the other
side as well. Even if worker participation can boost efficiency, it seems that ESOP law is not well structured to do
so. But, there's another question facing those who want to
use the law to encourage employee ownership and control
on efficiency grounds. One must argue further why the
government should subsidize democratic ESOPs or other
forms of employee participation. If they work, companies
should adopt them without subsidy. Those companies that
do will out-compete those that do not.
That is a standard argument against subsidies, 16 2 but I
think it goes too far in presuming the efficiency and evolutionary efficacy of markets. Various factors may inhibit
companies from adopting greater worker participation, even
if such participation would be highly efficient once widely
adopted. First, managers have their own self-interested
stake in limiting worker participation. The mechanisms
constraining managers may be too weak to induce them to
take action that undercuts their personal authority. Second, the efficacy of worker participation may be highly uncertain and require much learning about how to do it right.
This could create what economists somewhat obscurely call
increasing returns: high participation could succeed once
many have tried it, thereby reducing the uncertainty, but
early adopters have weak incentive to try.1 63 This dynamic
162

See, e.g., Levin, supra note 27; Fischel & Langbein, supra note

22; Doernberg & Macey, supra note 136; Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, Rights and Production Functions: An Application to LaborManagedFirms and Codetermination, 52 J. Bus. 469 (1979); Stephen M.
Bainbridge, supra note 157 at 702-04 (1996).
163 See Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economic Implicationsof Learning by
Doing, 29 REv. EcoN. STuD. 155 (1962); David Fudenberg & Jean Tirole,
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may also show up in the funding of worker-participatory
companies. Financial markets may find companies with
participation a risky unknown which, in turn, may lead to a
higher cost of capital for worker-participatory companies.

The resulting lack of worker-participatory companies reinforces their risk in the eyes of financiers, so they do not finance worker-participatory firms (or charge a higher interest rate), reinforcing in turn the lack of workerparticipatory firms, and so on in a vicious circle.' 64 Another
obstacle is that corporate law precedents may not be well
developed to handle problems unique to worker decisionmaking, as courts encounter few such companies. The
greater legal uncertainty surrounding such companies imposes another cost on them, again reinforcing their paucity
in the economy.' 65 The educational system may not do well
in instilling the skills required to engage in participatory
decision-making. 166 The broader society may not have created the kind of culture that encourages and aids worker
involvement.167

Learning by Doing and Market Performance, BELL J. ECON. 522 (1983);
W. Brian Arthur, Self-Reinforcing Mechanisms in Economics, in THE
ECONOMY AS AN EVOLVING COMPLEx SYSTEM 9 (Philip W. Anderson et. al.
eds., 1988).
'64 See Brett H. McDonnell, CreditMarkets, Learning, and Choice of
Alternatives, in LABOR MANAGED FIRMs AND BANKS, Ph.D. dissertation,
Stanford University (1994). Of course, the higher interest rates for
participatory companies may just reflect real operational risk inherent in
such companies, rather than unfamiliarity, emphasizing the general
difficulty discussed in the next paragraph of empirically determining the
practical importance of theories predicting increasing returns and lockin.
165 On how the development of corporate law may exhibit lock-in,
see
Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of
Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757 (1995); Klausner & Marcel Kahan,
Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracts (Or, the
Economics of Boilerplate), 83 VA. L. REV. 713 (1997); but see Mark A.
Lemley and David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Effects, 86
CAL. L. REV. 479, 562-86 (1988).
166 See William H. Simon, Comment, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 627 (1993).
167 See id.
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These and other factors may interact to make it quite
difficult to move from one institutional equilibrium to another. It is by now well understood that such selfreinforcing mechanisms may lead economies to inefficient
outcomes, with little or no tendency to move toward a more
efficient outcome.
The empirical importance of such
mechanisms is hotly debated. There has been much less
compelling empirical evidence (as opposed to theoretical
demonstrations) of widespread lock-in to inefficient results.
The issues are complex: the argument is often that an alternative organization form could be more efficient if it
were to become more widely adopted than the current standard. How is one to distinguish such a situation from one
where the current standard dominates because it is simply
the most efficient? The counterfactual of how well an economy dominated by employee-controlled companies would
function is very hard to determine.' 68 Nonetheless, the kind
of arguments briefly presented here suggest that the simple
argument against subsidy is not so certain as it might appear. Companies with more employee participation might
increase efficiency, yet market mechanisms might not lead
to more such companies. Even so, one would still have to
show that legal and political institutions would lead to increased efficiency where markets have allegedly failed.
Section V will address this issue.
D. Industrial and political democracy
ESOPs might be valued as a direct increase in industrial
democracy and an indirect boost to political democracy.
Even though this was not a goal of Congress, and hence
may well be an inappropriate goal for courts to pursue in

168

For skepticism on the argument that network externalities are

empirically important in the area of corporate law, see Lemley and
McGowan, supra note 165, at 562-86.
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interpreting federal laws,'69 it may be a goal that we as
analysts and advocates want social institutions to advance.
Industrial democracy envisions greater involvement of
workers in controlling their day-to-day working life. This
can have efficiency justifications, which I have already
briefly considered. It may also increase the psychological
fulfillment of workers and reduce alienation. 170 Some also
value industrial democracy in and of itself 7 1 Just as having a say in how you are governed politically is a key value
to many of us, so may be having a say in how you are governed in your working life, which after all is central to the
lives of most adults. Industrial democracy may also improve political democracy. It may help people become more
skilled in democratic decision-making and create a culture
which values democratic participation more.172 Some also
argue that increased equality of wealth from worker ownership may reduce the pernicious7 3 effects that wealth inequality has on political democracy.
What sort of workplaces would work best to advance this
set of concerns? Is direct, active involvement by many employees in decision-making crucial, or can the less intense
involvement of representative democratic decision-making
advance such values? Values such as psychological fulfillment, reduced alienation, and self-realization would seem
better advanced by more active involvement. Still, insofar
as employees believed their elected representatives fairly
represented them, more indirect forms of democracy can
advance such values as well. Moreover, the gain to indi169 Unless one takes a

highly dynamic approach to statutory

See WILLIAM N. EsKRIDGE JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION (1994).
170 For an argument along related lines promoting the value of selfrealization, see Elster, supra note 8.
171 See, e.g., Dahl, supra note 8, at 111-35.
172 See CAROL PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY
interpretation.

(1970); SAMUEL BOwLEs & HERBERT GINTIs, DEMOCRACY AND CAPITALISM
131-35 (1986).
173 See BOwLEs, supra note 172, at 101-07; but see supra, section
IV.A (arguing that ESOPs are a dubious means of decreasing wealth

inequality).
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viduals from greater participation in decision-making may
be an inverted U-shaped: too little involvement is alienating, but too much involvement is exhausting. An intermediate level of participation may be optimal.
As for the intrinsic value of having a say in how one's
workplace is governed, Robert Dahl has argued for a mostly
representative version of democracy in all but the small
company based on the intrinsic right to self-government.
He argues that most employees are roughly equal in their
ability to decide what sorts of decisions should be made,
collectively, and what decisions should be delegated to representatives. 4 The optimal mix of direct and representative democracy may well vary based on factors such as the
size of the company, the complexity of its operations, the
heterogeneity of the managerial abilities of employees, and
so on.
As for industrial democracy as a training ground for political democracy, again it is unclear whether direct or representative democracy is more appropriate. Direct democracy more actively involves employees, giving them more of
a chance to develop the skills of decision-making. But, representative democracy more closely resembles the sort of
decision-making that occurs in our political institutions.
Are ESOPs well designed to meet these goals? Insofar
as direct, rather than representative, democracy is more
appropriate, the answer is no. ESOPs at least have a better
shot at being valuable if we see representative democracy
as better in tune with the goals of industrial democracy.
Even here, though, ESOPs may well not be superior to
other ways of involving employees in ownership and control, such as the widespread use of employee stock options
or stock purchase programs. Indeed, the sort of in-bred
structure which ESOP committees often lead to-this paper's subject-would seem far worse than other ways of
giving employees an ownership stake. Still, one could envision an alternative version of ESOP law that encouraged
programs in which employees became actively involved in
174 See Dahl, supranote 8, at 116-20.
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decision-making. Simply giving employees shares with a
vote does not mean they will become actively involved in
voting. Various institutions could encourage more active
participation. One possible traditional institution, which
might fulfill similar functions, is unions. Indeed, unions
involved in ESOPs, or other forms of employee ownership,
might well be an effective way to advance the values underlying industrial democracy. There are at least two
problems with this, though. First, unions (in the United
States, at least), have generally not been open to involvement in managerial decisions, or ESOPs in particular.1 5
Second, unions have been on a decades-long decline, perhaps irreversible. Thus, although advocates of industrial
democracy should not give up on unions, they should explore other options as well. ESOPs are one such option.
Advancing industrial democracy does not seem to have
been a major purpose of Congress in establishing ESOP
laws. It does not show up in the legislative history, and it
would be rather strange for Congress to advance such a
fundamental and controversial goal through an obscure and
little-noticed segment of tax and ERISA law. Moreover, as
we have seen, ESOP law does not do much to encourage
greater employee control, as opposed to ownership. Indeed,
by creating a mechanism for greater management entrenchment, the law may do more to promote managerial
control than worker control.

E. Goals worth pursuing
We thus see that at least two goals may justify promoting ESOPs: efficiency and democracy. Two other oft-cited
goals, wealth equalization and capital formation, are weak
justifications, so in what follows I will ignore them. Of the
two potentially valid goals, efficiency is the least controversial: it was an actual goal of Congress, it tends to help (or
at least not hurt) most in society, and it is a goal courts
"7 See Joseph R. Blasi & Douglas L. Kruse, Strategic Problems and
TacticalPromise: Unions and Employee Ownership, 42 LABOR L. J. 498
(1991).
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pursue in many contexts. It is also the standard goal of law
and economics analysis. I shall thus consider it first and at
greater length in what follows. But, democracy is also a
fundamental value worth pursuing, and ultimately may
represent the most compelling justification for ESOPs. We
should not ignore it, and I will not.
V. A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS

Having identified the values that might justify ESOPs,
we now reach our core question: what legal approach to
ESOPs is most likely to advance those values? What
mechanisms can control management within a company
where an ESOP owns a significant share of stock, particularly where the ESOP owns over half of the outstanding
stock? We might look to markets, courts, executive agencies, legislatures, or to some combination of these, for help.
In this section I analyze these various institutions and their
abilities to do the job. Having done that, we can then ask
how our legal institutions can best advance our goals,
working within the broader social framework of these other
institutions.
I draw on the comparative institutional analysis framework developed in Neil Komesar's Imperfect Alternatives.
Komesar compares the relative strengths and weaknesses
of markets, legislatures, and courts in achieving various
policy goals, and stresses the need for a detailed analysis of
the relative abilities of each for
achieving any particular
17 6
goal under given circumstances.

Komesar's work strongly resembles the law and economics approach-indeed, it can be seen as a variant of law
and economics. 1 7 His framework has two strengths I would
like to emphasize and follow. First, he emphasizes the imSee KOMESAR, supra note 11, at 5.
17 Although it is possible to expand Komesar's framework by
borrowing tools from other disciplines, such as sociology, political science,
and psychology. For an argument on the desirability of doing so, see
Edward L. Rubin, Book Review: Institutional Analysis and the New
Legal Process, 1995 Wis. L. REV. 463 (1995).
176
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portance of comparative analysis.1 78 It is not enough, for
instance, to argue that courts are unlikely to monitor managers well. One also needs to argue that other mechanisms,
generally market-based ones, will do a better job, net their
social costs. Law and economics scholars sometimes take
this comparative approach-for instance, Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel often do so in The Economic
Structure of CorporateLaw' 79--but the needed comparisons
are ignored often enough that they bear emphasizing. Second, Komesar does not treat economic efficiency as the only
desirable social goal. Even if one cares to achieve goals
other than efficiency, economic analysis is still useful in
predicting the outcome of various policy alternatives and
evaluating how well different proposals are likely to achieve
the desired goal.18 0 Law and economics scholars tend to be
exclusive in their focus on efficiency; I do not intend to follow them in that respect. In doing so, I also follow William
Simon in recognizing that corporate law can be about politics and power, not just economics and contract.18 ' Achieving economic and political democracy is an important goal
to consider in analyzing ESOP law.

A. Courts
The plaintiffs in the cases we have considered tried to
expand the role of courts in monitoring managers of ESOPs
and their companies. Traditionally, courts have been reluctant to second-guess most business decisions. This reluctance is expressed as the business judgment rule.'8 2 The
178
179
'8
18

See KoMEsAR, supra note 11, at 5.
See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supranote 7, at 94.
See KOMESAR, supra note 11, at 10.
See Simon, supra note 9.

"If directors are sued with respect to a decision they have made..
the court will examine the decision only to the extent necessary to
determine whether the plaintiff has alleged and proven facts that
overcome the business judgment rule presumption that business
decisions are made by disinterested and independent directors on an
182

informed basis and with a good faith belief that the decisions will serve
the best interests of the corporations. If the presumption has not been
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main justification for that rule has been that courts are illequipped to judge what actions would best advance the interests of a business. Judges are lawyers, after all, not
businessmen. They also do not have anything close to the
amount of information available to managers. Furthermore, there's the danger of 20-20 hindsight vision-judges
see a case after events have happened, yet they must try to
determine whether an action was justified given the information available at the time of the decision. 183 These are
among the factors that make courts poor critics of most
business decisions. How is a court supposed to evaluate
whether the incumbent managers of an ESOP are doing a
good job in promoting the interests of the employee-owners,
and whether someone else would do a better job? The question is particularly hard in evaluating a board election
where no alternatives have been presented.
Nonetheless, it is not enough simply to point to the
business judgment rule and the limited competence of
courts. First of all, where conflicts of interest exist courts
apply the stricter duty of loyalty.1 4 In our circumstances
there does appear to be at least a potential conflict, as
managers may promote their own interests over those of
the employees they represent. The best justification for the
business judgment rule is not simply that courts are not
likely to do well in monitoring managers. For the most
part, market mechanisms do a pretty good job of constraining managers, and the cost of increased monitoring
from courts is too high for the relatively meager additional
benefits such monitoring provides.185
It is possible, however, that with an ESOP that controls
a majority of a company's stock, the market mechanisms do
not work nearly as well. We shall explore this possibility in
overcome, then the business judgment rule prohibits the court from going
further and examining the merits of the underlying business decision
and prevents a factfinder, in hindsight, from second-guessing the
decisions of directors." BLOCK, supra note 104, at 6 (citations omitted).
183 See id. at 98-99.
184 See BLOCK, supra note 104, at 262-62.
185 See id. at 94.
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the next subsection. Thus, although courts do not function
well, perhaps they are better than the market alternative,
or at least a useful supplement for the poorly functioning
market in this area. 186 For instance, courts play a stronger
monitoring role in applying fiduciary law when incumbent
managers take defensive actions to ward off hostile takeover attempts, where market mechanisms may not function
too well. 7 Perhaps fiduciary law in that context could be
useful in considering the role of courts faced with ESOPs.
So far I have focused on the role of courts in monitoring
how efficient managers are. We saw in section IV another
value that may justify ESOPs, namely industrial democracy. Are courts likely to effectively promote this value? A
key characteristic of courts is their relative independence
from day-to-day political pressures. 88 Thus, if legislatures
and agencies have biases against industrial democracy,
courts could do better;' 89 we shall explore those institutions
in later subsections. The independence of judges allows
them to give freer rein to their personal values. But, judges
tend to be drawn from the social elite, and likely tend to
identify more with managers than workers.' 90 Moreover,
courts and judges' chambers are not themselves model
democratic institutions. We should, therefore, not really
expect judges to be the best audience for industrial democracy advocates.

186

See KOMESAR, supra note 11, at 23 (stressing repeatedly that

frequently circumstances in which one institution functions poorly are
also circumstances in which others do poorly as well, so that the question
then becomes which institution is least bad.).
187 See supra section III.C.
188 See KomESAR, supranote 11, at 124-28.
189 Though for courts to interpret statutes to advance a goal not
supported by legislatures would be quite objectionable to many.
Nonetheless, it would not be the first time judges used their interpretive
powers to advance their own agendas, and some argue that if they
advance the right values this may be appropriate in some circumstances.
See ESKRIDGE, supra note 169.
190 I know of no systematic evidence on this point, but it seems
plausible.
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Moreover, the process of going to court is not democratic.
Courts require a formal, adversarial process, and judges
(unelected, at least in federal court) get to decide the outcome.' 91 Democracy involves more informal give and take.
It can be adversarial, but it can also be more cooperative.
In a democracy all participants can make their case, and
then in the end all get a share in the decision-making
through voting. In Grindstaff, the collective bargaining
between NAC and the union at least was a process with
some democratic elements. The move to court was a move
to a much less democratic process. 192 Perhaps courts can
serve a useful role in policing more democratic processes to
make sure they function properly, but going to court itself is
far from a democratic experience.
This analysis of courts suggests they are not an especially good institution for making ESOP companies more
efficient or more democratic. We must reserve final judgment, though, until we have considered whether the alternatives do any better.
B. The market
The dominant view in law and economics scholarship
treats corporations as a nexus of contracts. 93 It focuses on
the agency problem that exists between shareholders and
managers, and analyzes ways in which various market
mechanisms help limit the misbehavior of managers. Although the analysis differs somewhat for public and closely
held corporations, 94 for both types of ESOPs, holding a
See Austin Sarat, Going to Court: Access, Autonomy, and the
Contradictionof Liberal Legality, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 97-114 (David
191

Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998).
192 Although the pre-trial settlement process may often look more
like political or workplace bargaining.
193 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 7, at 15-22.
19
Closely held corporations feature few shareholders and thin
markets, with each shareholder owning a relatively large share of the
firm.
Public corporations are the opposite, with many small
shareholders, most or all owning only a tiny fraction of the outstanding
shares, and a highly active market for trading shares.
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large percentage of a company's shares can cause serious
problems for the ordinary control mechanisms.
For large public corporations with many small stockholders there is a long literature going back decades fretting over the separation of ownership and control.'95
Shareholders face a free rider problem: each would prefer
that the others engage in the costly monitoring of managers, and no one has adequate incentive to do so himself.
probably do little
Ordinary shareholder voting mechanisms 196
to constrain managers of such companies.
But, voting, along with the trading of shares, is important because it makes possible tender offers and hostile
takeovers.1 97 If incumbent managers are not maximizing
the value of a company, and some outsider thinks she could
do better, the outsider can offer to buy shares at a premium. If she thereby succeeds in gaining a controlling
share, she can vote out the old directors. She can vote for
directors that she prefers, and the new board can in turn
replace the management. The mere threat of takeovers can
It is because defensive
help check mismanagement.1 98
measures can seriously weaken this takeover mechanism
that Delaware courts apply the heightened scrutiny discussed above in section III.C. The literature on takeovers is
of course voluminous, and there is much disagreement over
details and how much of a checking effect hostile takeovers
have. But, the general drift of this literature is that takeovers are one important means of checking mismanagement. 99
An ESOP can thwart this mechanism and become a
takeover defense mechanism. The problem is particularly
195 The starting point is BERLE & MEANS, supra note 3.
196 See John Pound, Proxy Contests and the Efficiency of Shareholder
Oversight, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 237 (1988).
197 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 7, at 70-71.
'9' See id. at 173.
199 For some summaries, see id. at 162-211. See also ROBERTA
ROMNANO et. al., FOuNDATIONs OF CORPORATE LAw 229-300; RONALD J.
GILsON & BERNARD S. BLACK eds., THE LAW AND FINANcE OF CORPORATE
AcQUISITIONs ch. 10, 363-97 (2d ed. 1995).
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acute where the ESOP owns a majority of shares, and the
company's managers in turn control the ESOP. Such a
company's management could be immune to a hostile takeover. Even where the ESOP owns less than a majority of
shares, its existence can make it harder for a bidder to acquire a majority. True, in public companies there must be
pass through voting on all votes for vested shares. Still,
workers are often unlikely to vote in favor of a takeover out
of fear for their jobs, and entrenched managers may control
the votes of unallocated shares. The use of ESOPs as a
both in
takeover defense mechanism has aroused comment,
200
cases.
court
some
in
and
literature
the academic
Other markets besides the market for stocks with its associated takeover threat can help constrain managers. The
managerial labor market gives managers a reason to perform well at their current job so that they can move on to a
better one. 0 1 Of course, entrenched managers need not
worry about being fired, so this is an incentive only for
those who choose to leave, or who fear company bankruptcy.
Moreover, hiring firms often can't tell how well one manager has done-even for high-level managers, the performance of their former firms is highly imperfectly correlated
with how well the manager managed.
The need to raise money through debt also helps constrain managers. Debtholders may monitor firms directly,
and they may impose various contractual constraints limiting misbehavior.0 2 More deeply, the likely need to seek

future financing helps rein in managers. In Grindstaffthe

200 See Grannis, supra note 118; BLASI & KRUSE, supra note 5, at
139-210. The antitakeover effect of ESOPs would be less objectionable if
they also allowed employees to become actively involved in checking
managers in other ways. Unfortunately, they do not usually seem to do
so, and thus one check on management is lost without a gain in other

checks.

See Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the
Firm, 86 J. POL. EcoN. 288, 295-306 (1980).
202 See Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation,
HARvARD Bus. REv. 61 (1989).
201
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defendants claimed that they rejected pass through voting
because their lenders would have disapproved. °3
Another important market checking managers is the
product market and the possibility of bankruptcy. If managers cannot offer products at a price which will sell and
which yields revenues exceeding cost, eventually their company will go bankrupt. The managers must then seek a
new job, and will have to explain to would-be employers
how their company went bust. Alas, this constraint can
take a long time to work, and the offending managers may
be gone by the time bankruptcy hits.
Though product, debt, and managerial labor markets
help constrain managers, they are all quite imperfect, and
ESOPs can largely undercut the takeover mechanism. Do
ESOPs facilitate any other market mechanisms of control?
Workers themselves are potentially effective monitors.
They know much about how a company is run and how it
could be run better. Furthermore, they have incentive to
persuade the company to try their ideas. This, indeed, underlies most efficiency arguments in favor of worker participation.204 For public corporations, an ESOP must follow

pass through voting on vested shares for all shareholder
votes. 2 5 Thus, perhaps for public corporations the loss of
203
204

20

See Grindstaff,133 F.3d at 419.
See supra note 4.
However, for unallocated shares, which can be quite a big chunk

of the total, especially in the early years of an ESOP, the ESOP need not
meet such requirements. If the trust votes the unallocated shares so as
to mirror the vote of the allocated shares, then the possible check on
managers remains. Some, though, have argued that such mirrored
voting is inappropriate, as present holders of vested shares may have
interests that differ from future voters. Moreover, workers tend to vote
in favor of management and against takeovers. See Grannis, supra note
118. The Department of Labor apparently takes this position as well,
and the First Circuit has endorsed it, at least where employee-owners
are not given notice that their votes will affect the votes of unallocated
shares. See Herman, 126 F.3d at 1368. Perhaps, but where managers
perform the fiduciary voting, it seems to me that mirrored voting is more
likely to reflect the interests of future participants, and certainly more
likely to avoid managerial entrenchment, than is allowing managers
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the takeover threat is at least partially compensated for by
employee-shareholders monitoring management. Whether
this really happens is a tough empirical question. Effective
worker monitoring probably requires more active participatory mechanisms than shareholder voting alone.
For closely held corporations the analysis differs somewhat. In most circumstances the takeover mechanism does
not exist to help constrain managers. However, usually the
separation of ownership and control is much less severe.
There are a few owners with large stakes in the company,
and these owners manage the company, or have strong control over the managers and incentive to exercise that con26
trol.
However, an ESOP structure may recreate the separation of ownership and control, as company mangers control
the ESOP's votes but do not receive the income from the
shares. The lack of a takeover threat hence becomes much
more serious. The other mechanisms mentioned abovemanagerial labor markets, debtholders, product market,
and bankruptcy-may help constrain managers to some
degree.
Employee monitoring may work if the ESOP
provides for pass through voting, but the law only requires
this in closely held corporations for votes on fundamental
corporate changes, and most firms with ESOPs do not
provide for pass through voting on other matters. 20 7 It is
ironic that the law requires pass through voting only for
restructurings, where employees are more likely to support
managers, and not in other matters where employees might
play a more active role.
Unions provide one other possible means for checking
management, and for inducing a firm to adopt an ESOP
structure giving workers more of a say.20 8 Indeed, in Grind-

discretion in how to vote unallocated shares constrained only by a
fiduciary duty enforced by courts.
206 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 7, at 228-29.
207 See BLASI, supra note 6, 167-68.
208 See Elana Ruth Hollo, Note, The Quiet Revolution: Employee
Stock Ownership Plans and Their Influence on Corporate Governance,
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staff the union was the main voice pushing for more employee control. However, Grindstaff also illustrates that
unions often lose to management. More importantly, most
workers in the United States do not belong to a union. 0 9
Moreover, unions have generally not been receptive to
ESOPs, and hence cannot usually be counted on to advocate
more powerful ESOPs.
Thus, although many of the market mechanisms for controlling management misbehavior remain in place, the
ESOP does pose a threat to an important one for public corporations, the hostile takeover, and in close corporations an
ESOP may create a separation of ownership and control.
The market is thus often less effective in constraining managers and promoting efficiency for an ESOP-controlled corporation than it is for corporations without ESOPs. For
ESOPs like Demoplace Corp., worker involvement will provide an alternative method to monitor managers, but for
Managers, Inc. there is nothing like that.
Our other value of interest is industrial democracy.
How well does the market promote that? Market advocates
typically maintain that if worker-controlled firms are efficient, they should flourish in a free market economy. Even
if they are less efficient than other firms, if workers value
democracy they can take a cut in pay to work in a cooperative.210 In section IV.C. I suggested various reasons this
might not be true. Uncertainty, increasing returns due to
learning effects, imperfections in capital markets, gaps in
corporate law, a biased educational system, and cultural
factors are among the many reasons markets may not always give the most efficient and desirable outcome. It is of
course a big question, and one well beyond the range of this
paper, how important such factors actually are. As suggested above, this is quite a difficult issue, and one that has
not been satisfactorily addressed in many contexts. Note
Labor Unions, and Future American Policy, 23 RUTGERS L.J. 561 (1992);
Blasi & Kruse, supra note 175.
209 See Blasi & Kruse, supra note 175, at 175.
210 See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 162.
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too that even if the conditions for lock-in exist, it is quite
possible that we have locked-in to the most efficient alternative. Moreover, even if the mechanisms leading to possible inefficiencies are important, that is not yet a sufficient
argument for governmental intervention in favor of employee ownership-one of the important lessons of comparative institutional analysis. That is true even when we recognize industrial democracy as a value quite separate from
efficiency.
Within an economy like ours where ESOPs are usually
created by the managers of hierarchical firms rather than
by the employees of initially democratic firms, will market
forces push firms towards greater democracy in their use of
ESOPs? There might be an exit mechanism, where workers
are drawn to firms with more democratic ESOPs. 21 ' That,
though, is subject to the sorts of objections discussed in the
last paragraph. Unions could provide a voice mechanism
supporting industrial democracy, but as already noted, they
have so far proven reluctant to do so, and anyway are a
nonexistent voice in most workplaces.
Thus, markets do seem to have added problems regulating companies with ESOPs. The takeover mechanism is
weakened for public corporations, and separation of ownership and control may be created in closely held corporations. Many control mechanisms are still in place, such as
debt, product, and managerial labor markets. In some
ESOPs, active worker involvement may provide a new control mechanism. The effect of ESOPs on market mechanisms is thus not totally clear, in direction or size. We must
continue our tour of possible institutional alternatives.
C. Agencies
Executive branch agencies are another institution that
conceivably could control wayward management. The main
agency of interest here is the Department of Labor. In
211

voice).

See HiRsciImAN, supra note 152 (discussing exit as opposed to
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Grindstaff and O'Neill the Department entered only indirectly, as one source suggesting how the court should interpret the law.2 12 No one seems to have suggested that the
Department should supervise elections in ESOP firms and
certify whether the decisions of management are fair to
workers, although this is a logical possibility. The Department does play some role in related areas of ESOP law. In
particular, when companies first issue stock to an ESOP the
Department examines the issue and determines whether
the company has fairly priced the stock-incumbent managers often have an incentive to overvalue the213stock, causing the ESOP to pay too much to the company.
Agency bureaucrats typically have more expertise in the
area they regulate than generalist judges. However, this
expertise comes at a price. Bureaucrats are less independent than judges, and more subject to lobbying, as they repeatedly make decisions in the same area. Bureaucratic
regulation also tends to be more intrusive than judicial
monitoring, as regulation involves review of all transactions
of a certain type, whereas courts only get involved in those
instances where disputes arise.214
In the case at hand, there is perhaps less room for specialized competence than in many instances of regulation.
Whether an ESOP fiduciary has voted stock shares wisely
will depend on very different considerations for different
companies in different circumstances. The Department of
Labor probably does not have much particular expertise in
answering such questions. It is unclear whether the Department is likely to be captured by particular interests pulling in any one direction.2 15
Labor unions would seem the constituency most likely to
212
213

See Grindstaff,133 F.3d at 424; O'Neill, 721 F.Supp. at 1015.
See Ezra S. Field, Note, Money for Nothing and Leverage for Free:

The Politics and History of the Leveraged ESOP Tax Subsidy, 97 COLUM.
L. REV. 740 (1997).
214 See Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of
Safety, 37 J. LEG. STUD. 357 (1984).
215 See Field, supra note 213 (discussing lobbying in a related area of
ESOP law).
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capture the Department. One would expect that the civil
servants drawn to the Department would tend to be sympathetic to union concerns. However, employer groups are
also likely to lobby the Department, and employer associations are in general the most successful and powerful segment of political lobbyists. Much probably also depends on
which party controls the White House, and hence is able to
make high level appointments. Insofar as labor groups
have a strong influence, that might suggest that the Department could effectively pursue the ideal of industrial
democracy; however, given the relative coldness of unions to
ESOPs, it is not clear if that is true.
Even if the Department of Labor is not a terribly attractive candidate for regulating the actions of ESOP fiduciaries in voting ESOP shares, it might be a more attractive
candidate for deciding how ERISA should be interpretedthe Chevron argument. The Department does have much
expertise in the functioning of ERISA, which it supervises.
The over-regulation by bureaucracy problem is much less
severe for this meta-question, where the Department is not
being asked to regulate ordinary business decisions of fiduciaries, but rather being asked its advice in how far courts
should go in enforcing the fiduciary duty.
For this point too it is unclear whether labor or management has captured the Department. One would be at
least somewhat less worried about the possibility of capture
if the agency were forced to go through a more formal rulemaking process of soliciting input from all interested parties and then defending its position with publicly-stated
reasons in order to announce a position.
D. Congress
From the argument so far it would appear desirable for
Congress to amend the laws affecting ESOPs. On either
efficiency or industrial democracy grounds it is hard to defend subsidies for ESOPs where the employees do not have
full control voting the ESOPs' shares. Perhaps subsidies
are not justified even with such control; without it, the sub-
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sidies make little sense. The right the Grindstaff plaintiffs
struggled unsuccessfully for is a right that should be present in all tax-favored ESOPs. This would lead to fewer
ESOPs, but those left would be better ones.
So would those who agree with the Grindstaff plaintiffs
be well advised to concentrate on changing federal statutes?
Good luck to them-they're going to need it. It is not
enough to say there ought to be a law-one must examine
the underlying political forces and judge whether Congress
is likely to pass that law. It is not clear how the improved
law I suggested would be passed.
ESOP law may well be an example of how a law becomes
entrenched. Although the ESOP rules do seem to aid
managerial entrenchment, there does not seem to have initially been a great demand from groups representing managers for these rules.1 6 The ESOP rules seem largely to
have resulted when one man, Louis Kelso, convinced one
influential senator, Russell Long, that they would be a good
idea. The rules were passed with little controversy, buried
in obscure parts of the tax code and ERISA.217
Once passed, though, the ESOP rules built a constituency. Kelso's company and others started promoting
ESOPs, and gradually companies adopted them. Managers
in firms with ESOPs, along with the investment bankers
who design and promote them, now have an interest in preserving the law, and encouraging more ESOPs. These
groups will lobby to prevent change, as they did in 1986.218
On the other side, there's little sign of any concentrated
group likely to push for reform. Unions are the most likely
candidate, but so far they have been more interested in
burying or ignoring ESOPs than in improving them. 2 9 Absent a change of heart, they seem unlikely to be the impetus for change. Moreover, ESOPs are riot an issue of major
public interest, so it is the sort of topic likely to be domi16
217
218
219

See BLASI, supranote 6, at 18-22.
See id.
See id. at 154-57.
See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
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nated by special, concentrated interests. Perhaps the interests on both sides are weak enough that politicians could be
persuaded to follow a good policy analysis, as the electoral
and fundraising consequences of doing so may be slight.
Perhaps, but I am not holding my breath.
Which legal approach is likely to achieve the best outcome? What legal approach is most likely to advance the
goals of increasing efficiency and productivity or industrial
democracy? Section III laid out two basic alternatives in a
case where ESOP managers have voted ESOP stock shares
in a board election to entrench their own position as company managers. One alternative demands that plaintiffs
must show something more than such a vote in order to
state a claim. 220 The other alternative would allow plaintiffs to state a claim simply by showing that there was such
a vote, and the managers would then have the burden of
producing evidence that their action was well-informed
and/or reasonably in the interest of employee-shareholders.
The latter alternative involves more intrusive court scrutiny of the voting decisions of ESOP managers.2 1 We have
seen that some market mechanisms which constrain managers are considerably weakened, if not eliminated, for
companies where ESOPs control a significant share of the
stock but employees are not actively involved in deciding
how the ESOPs' shares are voted, although other sorts of
market mechanisms do remain in place-the market for
managers, the product market and bankruptcy, monitoring
by debtholders, and so on. Moreover, regulation and oversight by the Department of Labor is not a particularly attractive alternative, and Congress appears unlikely to
modify the objectionable elements of ERISA law in the foreseeable future. Thus, there is room to argue for a rather
active judicial role in applying the current law.

What that something more might be is a major question.
Although the real differences might shrivel if the something
more, which must be pleaded under the first alternative, is not much
more.
220
221
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But, as usual, courts are not likely to be very good at
second-guessing the ordinary business decisions of managers. In O'Neill the court faced an internal struggle between
existing managers-how is it to resolve that? How are federal judges supposed to say who would be the best members
of a company's board? Moreover, managers would be likely
to respond to a strengthened fiduciary duty by building a
record showing they have inquired diligently into alternatives, and then voting for themselves anyway. In most
cases they will be able to cite plausible reasons for voting
for themselves, and so long as they have followed an adequate procedure, courts will go along. Requiring more
would in most cases probably lead to wasted resources.
There's no point getting federal courts involved unless
plaintiffs can plead somewhat more serious wrongdoing
than the vote itself. A number of market mechanisms constraining managers do remain.
However, what the "plus" of "entrenchment plus" might
be is an interesting and important question. Given the
greater weakness of market controls in these cases, that
plus might be less than is required to invoke heightened
scrutiny in other contexts. Perhaps that is the best way of
understanding Judge Krupansky's dissent in Grindstaff--he
thought the plaintiffs had pleaded something more, even
though he is pretty vague as to what that might be.222 Perhaps directors voting for themselves in a contested election
should trigger heightened scrutiny, though that is a marginal instance for doing so. The heightened scrutiny that
follows, though, should not be the strict scrutiny of examining the board's decision for its entire fairness, which
arises upon a showing of circumstances demonstrating a
conflict of interest. Rather, intermediate scrutiny along the
lines of the second and third prongs of Leigh should apply:
managers would have to show independent investigation
and a reasonable relation to the interest of employeeshareholders to justify a decision that evokes this scrutiny.

222

See Grindstaff,133 F.3d at 433 (Krupansky, J., dissenting).
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The more aggressive second alternative, invoking
heightened scrutiny whenever ESOP trustees vote for
themselves, might seem better as a means of promoting
industrial democracy. If, however, I am correct in predicting that companies would respond with a relatively empty
form of due diligence, that is not so. A more aggressive judicial approach, moreover, might act as a lure bringing
plaintiffs into federal court. Federal court is probably not
the best place to fight battles for industrial democracy.
Though the union in Grindstaff was on the right track in
seeking greater control over ESOP votes, perhaps democracy would be better served had the union remained in the
workplace and increased its efforts to organize and engage
workers and negotiate with managers to achieve its goal.
VI. CONCLUSION
The message of this analysis is in some ways rather discouraging. Federal ESOP law allows, even encourages,
managers to give workers ownership of shares in their companies while the managers retain control for themselves,
significantly weakening market constraints on those managers without correspondingly increasing the potential for
employees themselves limiting managers.
Courts are
highly limited in how effectively they can provide helpful
extra constraints. This state of affairs does nothing to
plausibly advance any desirable general goals, and yet
Congress appears unlikely to change the laws any time
soon.
Yet, all is not doom and gloom. For one, courts can help,
albeit in a very modest way. Where management behavior
raises enough concern to trigger heightened scrutiny, the
courts might have some deterrent effect. Our doctrinal and
policy analyses both suggest that after a showing of "entrenchment plus," the burden should shift to defendant
managers to justify their decision to vote for themselves, by
showing adequate investigation and a reasonable relationship between their decision and the interests of employeeowners. The resulting scrutiny would be intermediate be-
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tween the normal business judgment rule and the heightened scrutiny under the duty of loyalty. Such mid-level
scrutiny would probably lead to relatively few plaintiff victories, but the threat of submitting to such scrutiny may
force managers to be somewhat more cautious than they
otherwise might be in entrenching themselves. It is not a
lot, but even a little helps.
Furthermore, perhaps the long-term prospects for reforming the law are not quite so bleak. If unions were to
become involved in this issue, they would probably have a
decent chance at persuading Congress to reform the law.
The most obvious reform is requiring pass through voting
on all shareholder votes for all ESOPs which receive tax
breaks, perhaps combined with proportional voting for unallocated shares. Although the current law has created
some institutional support for itself, that support is not so
strong that it could clearly defeat the still-considerable
clout of unions. Perhaps the least likely part of this scenario is getting unions interested in the issue. For many
decades American unions have focused on wages, benefits,
and jobs, and left issues of control of the workplace to management. 223

But the steady decline of unions, combined

with changes in how work is organized, could conceivably
induce the union movement to reevaluate this strategy. If
so, reforming ESOP law would be one natural area for unions to consider.
The potential political base for more democratic ESOPs
goes beyond unions. In the United States, with President
Clinton and the Democratic Leadership Council, and in
Europe with various social democratic and socialist leaders,
such as Tony Blair in Great Britain, there has been discussion of a "third way" between traditional statist socialism
and untrammeled capitalism, a way more responsive to
modern economic realities than the increasingly hoary welfare state. Expanded worker ownership fits snugly with
such an intermediate political vision. Worker ownership
'

See Karl E. Kare, Critical Theory and Labor Relations Law, in
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focuses on action through the market, rather than through
the state, yet it somewhat equalizes the balance of power
from that found in pure capitalism. Expanded encouragement of more democratic ESOPs can be a means for third
way politicians to nudge along the market a bit.
Perhaps most importantly, even if the law remains unchanged much good can be done within that law. Although
the current law does little to actively encourage greater
worker participation and control, it does create space for it.
Activists could focus on creating more Demoplace Corps,
even though the Managers, Inc.'s of the world will not disappear. A minority of ESOPs have combined ownership
with greater employee participation, and these have tended
24
to be more economically successful than other ESOPs.
The subsidy provided ESOPs under current tax law can
help to counter-balance the disadvantages of trying to establish more worker control within an environment where
such control is rare.225 That is not the intent behind the
law, but that law can be harnessed to unintended ends.
Thus, perhaps advocates of workplace democracy should
focus their efforts outside the political sphere. Too many
advocates of greater equality and social justice are addicted
to schemes involving more government. The experience of
every-day, lived-out democracy is best gained through local
activity and smaller institutions, not centralized government agencies. Activists unhappy with the current way of
doing things, then, may be best advised to use existing
ESOP law to create more Demoplace Corps, rather than
trying to fight Managers, Inc. in court.

224 See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
225 See Alan Hyde, Ownership, Contract and Politics in
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